Abstract
Several years ago I thought that I understood Kant’s theory of criminal punishment—an understanding aided by a Rawlsian reconstruction of certain aspects of that theory.1 I thought that Kant’s theory was profound, inspiring, and—although subject to certain problems—the only morally acceptable theory of punishment.2 I was confident that all philosophical work on problems of crime and punishment could be done within a generally Kantian perspective (which I took to be an unambiguously retributive perspective), and some of my own work exhibited that confidence to an uncritical degree.3 KeywordsSupra NoteState CoercionCriminal PunishmentMoral JustificationMoral EvilThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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