Does it make sense to speak of neuroethics?

Abstract

The field of bioethics has been split into subspecialties over the past few decades. In some cases, it was divided in terms of social domains, such as clinical ethics, research ethics and public‐health ethics. In other cases, it was separated in terms of methodological approaches, including principle‐based bioethics, virtue ethics and narrative ethics. Yet more divisions were made in terms of medical specialties, such as paediatric ethics, surgical ethics and psychiatric ethics. A more recent trend is to identify subfields in terms of new lines of scientific or technological investigation, such as genethics, nanoethics and neuroethics. > …the basic ethical concerns about threats to identity are not different in the context of neuroscience or genetics… Given the rich history of bioethics, we would not suggest that there is only one correct way forward or that speaking of new subfields is completely wrong. Indeed, Adina Roskies recently made a strong case specifically for neuroethics: “although neuroethics may appear to consist of a collection of diverse and unrelated concerns, the various issues emerging from the confluence of neuroscience and ethics are so densely interconnected that it is defensible, and may even be profitable, to consider them as a unified whole” (Roskies, 2006). Because no one has the infinite energy necessary to consider all aspects of bioethics, limiting oneself to a quasi‐discrete scientific arena can help to focus attention. Moreover, because studying ethics requires a firm grip on the science—and it will take ethicists time to catch up with the latest research in fields as complex as genetics, nanoscience and neuroscience—we can appreciate the case for speaking of bioethical subfields. Nevertheless, although we grant that speaking in such terms can be reasonable, we also want to call attention to some of the dangers associated with carving up bioethics into ever more specialized subfields that …