Does Fusion Undermine American Third Parties? An Analysis of House Elections from 1870 to 2016

Abstract

Many third-party scholars argue that fusion, or the co-nomination of a single candidate by multiple parties, strengthens American third parties. They argue that a widespread use of fusion in the late nineteenth century fueled third-party support, that the prohibition of fusion by most states around 1900 undermined third parties, and that the continued use of fusion in New York State is a primary reason why third parties remain strong there. In this paper, which is based on a district-level analysis of all elections to the House of Representatives since 1870, I argue the opposite. In recent elections, third-party candidates have fared worse, not better, in fusion states, and the historical evidence shows that a widespread use of fusion has consistently led to the destruction of third parties. The evidence presented here suggests that the primary impact of fusion is that it helps major parties co-opt third parties, and therefore, the more effective strategy for third parties would be to instead challenge the major parties more aggressively. The paper also suggests, on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Caucus for a New Political Science, how statistically driven research can be better integrated into the Caucus’s mission to make the study of politics more relevant for progressive change.