Abstract
Frege's Puzzle is ordinarily introduced by way of example. We are presented with Frege-style cases in which co-referential names are not intersubstitutable salva veritate. I argue that this way of introducing the puzzle not only begs the question against Millianism but fails to account for our puzzlement. I propose a way of formulating the puzzle that captures the import of Frege's observations while avoiding presuppositions that bias the discussion.
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