Abstract
To promote third-party environmental pollution control in China, it is necessary to dissect the mechanism of fiscal policy in third-party environmental pollution control. This study first discusses the acting paths of fiscal policies on third-party environmental pollution control in theory. A tripartite evolutionary game model involving the local government, the polluting enterprise, and the third-party enterprise is established. The replicator dynamics, evolutionary stability strategies, and numerical simulation of the behavior of the three participants are analyzed to further study the acting mechanism of fiscal policy in third-party environmental pollution control. In addition, the influences of other parameters on the implementation of third-party environmental pollution control are evaluated. The results show that the behaviors of the local government, the polluting enterprise, and the third-party enterprise influence each other. Furthermore, strengthening the relevant fiscal policy, reducing the risks of the polluting enterprise and third-party enterprise, and improving the benefit to the local government are conducive to promoting third-party environmental pollution control in China. Based on these results, this study proposes the following policy implications: formulating fiscal policies for third-party environmental pollution control, implementing fiscal policies in a dynamic and progressive manner, improving the market mechanism of third-party environmental pollution control, and strengthening the environmental performance assessment of the local government.
Highlights
China has received high attention from countries worldwide due to its rapid economic growth, industrialization, and urbanization
Through the analysis of dynamic evolution path and evolutionary stability strategy, the results showed that the heterogeneity of local government was not conducive to the formation and stability of the cooperative control model, while the administrative penalties imposed by the superior government was just the opposite [45]
The conclusions are described as follows: (1) When the local government implements a fiscal policy for third-party environmental pollution control, the decisions of the local government, the polluting enterprise and the third-party enterprise influence each other
Summary
China has received high attention from countries worldwide due to its rapid economic growth, industrialization, and urbanization. Jiang et al (2019) proposed an evolutionary game model of government environmental regulation including polluting enterprises, local governments and central governments in China. Du et al (2015) constructed an evolutionary model between third-party pollution control enterprises and governments under different parameters. Xu et al (2018) established a tripartite evolutionary game model involving governments, environmental service enterprises and polluting enterprises. Duan et al (2016) established tripartite evolutionary game models of government-enterprise-social based on system dynamics. Chen and Hu (2018) developed an evolutionary game theory model between governments and manufacturers based on different combinations of carbon taxes and subsidies. Research investigating third-party environmental pollution control under fiscal policy by a tripartite evolutionary game model has not been performed. (3) What fiscal policies and suggestions could be proposed to promote third-party environmental pollution control in China?.
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