Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and how family ownership enhances or damages firm value. Design/methodology/approach – The paper studies a sample of Canadian companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) between 1999 and 2007 and apply multivariate regression with firm value as a dependent variable. The paper measures firm value as Tobin ' s Q and ROA based either on net income or EBITDA. The independent variables include family firm dummy and ownership percentage. Findings – It is found that control-enhancing mechanisms which are often employed by family companies add value to companies. Furthermore, it is found that agency conflicts between ownership and management are less costly than those between majority and minority shareholders, suggesting that family ownership helps resolve the agency conflicts between ownership and management and in turn enhances firm value. Finally, it is found that family companies with founders as CEOs outperform those with descendants as CEOs. Research limitations/implications – The paper studies Canadian family firms; as such, the sample size is not relatively large. Nonetheless, the results should be generalized as Canada is one of the largest markets in the world and have high integration with the rest of the world. Practical implications – The results suggest investors should invest in family ownership firms. Originality/value – The paper shows whether firm ownership increases firm value and the determinant of family firm value.

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