Abstract
We run an eye-tracking experiment to investigate whether players change their gaze patterns and choices after they experience alternative models of choice in one-shot games. In phase 1 and 3, participants play 2 × 2 matrix games with a human counterpart; in phase 2, they apply specific decision rules while playing with a computer with known behavior. We classify participants in types based on their gaze patterns in phase 1 and explore attentional shifts in phase 3, after players were exposed to the alternative decision rules. Results show that less sophisticated players, who focus mainly on their own payoffs, change their gaze patterns towards the evaluation of others’ incentives in phase 3. This attentional shift predicts an increase in equilibrium responses in relevant classes of games. Conversely, cooperative players do not change their visual analysis. Our results shed new light on theories of bounded rationality and on theories of social preferences.
Highlights
Nash equilibrium is a prominent concept in game theory
In an eye-tracking experiment, we investigate if unsophisticated types of players change their patterns of information acquisition and choices after they experience alternative decision rules
Results show that the visual analysis of level-1 players shifts towards the one predicted by the level-2 strategy after the exposure to alternative decision rules, including level-2 play
Summary
Nash equilibrium is a prominent concept in game theory. extensive empirical evidence has shown systematic departures from standard equilibrium predictions in many different games (Camerer 2003). Less sophisticated players (level-1) disregard relevant pieces of information that are necessary to evaluate the incentives of the counterpart and to predict her move (Costa-Gomes et al 2001; Polonio et al 2015) Another type of player (cooperative) focuses on intra-cell comparisons between payoffs, framing the problem as a pure coordination game and disregarding dominant choices of the counterpart: this pattern of visual analysis lead to cooperative choices in line with models of social preferences (Devetag et al 2016). These results offer new insights on theories of bounded rationality and social preferences
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