Does Expectation Setting Condition Retrospective Voting?

Abstract

It is widely established that voters respond to government performance. But can politicians a ffect retrospective voting by setting certain expectations ex ante? Observational data is insufficient to address this question because expectation setting may be confounded with performance or candidate traits, thereby producing spurious correlations. Accordingly, we conduct a series of between-subjects experiments in which we independently manipulate both expectation setting and the eventual outcome. In domains where politicians have practical authority, or direct influence over outcomes, setting high expectations incurs a cost in public support if the projected outcome is not attained. The same is true in domains where politicians have theoretical authority, or limited influence but where expectation setting sends a signal about the leader's judgment. However, in domains where politicians have neither practical nor theoretical authority, setting high expectations is unambiguously bene ficial, implying that optimism is valued by voters as a personality disposition.