Does counter‐mobilization contain right‐wing populist movements? Evidence from Germany

Abstract

AbstractRight‐wing populist (RWP) movements have been on the rise in Western democracies. Outside of party politics, such movements regularly organize demonstrations against political elites and minority groups. At the same time, civil society coalitions have mobilized against these movements. Yet we know little about the effect of counter‐demonstrations on RWP protest activities. We derive competing theoretical expectations from previous work. On the one hand, counter‐mobilization reduces mobilization because the original movement is less likely to achieve its goals (expected utility/costs). On the other hand, clashes and standoffs between opposing movements facilitate mobilization through polarization and anger (identity/emotions). We empirically analyze movement–countermovement dynamics using a new city‐level event dataset on street protests by the German Pegida movement and its opponents. In our quantitative analysis, we investigate how counter‐mobilization is associated with the onset of Pegida protests, their intensity in terms of participant numbers, and their demobilization. Counter‐mobilization does not prevent protest onset, but large counter‐demonstrations are associated with larger subsequent Pegida protests, and violence against Pegida supporters reduces the likelihood that they will stop protesting.