Does corporate governance structures promote shareholders or stakeholders value maximization? Evidence from African banks

Abstract

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between corporate governance structures and stakeholder and shareholder value maximization perspectives in 267 African banks from 2006 to 2011.Design/methodology/approachThe authors used the Prais–Winsten ordinary least squares and random effect regression models to explore this relationship to ensure consistency and efficiency in results. The data for this study were collected from Bankscope.FindingsThe results of this study show that corporate governance structures such as CEO duality, nonexecutive members and extreme large board size lead to a reduction in both shareholder and stakeholder value maximization. However, audit independence and board size also promote both shareholder and stakeholder value maximization. Although gender diversity promotes profit maximization, it was not significant in any of the models estimated. The results further suggest that the same corporate governance structures promote and detract shareholder and stakeholder value maximization in Africa although the effect of corporate governance structures was weightier on shareholder value maximization confirming the agency theory.Practical implicationsFrom these findings, bank management must pursue the institution of good corporate governance structures and avoid weak corporate governance structures to promote shareholder and stakeholder value maximization. Also equity holders may have to pay particular attention to corporate governance structures because they benefit the most from the institution of good corporate governance structures.Originality/valueThis study explores and compares how corporate governance structures promote shareholder and stakeholder value maximization separately in African banks. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first of such studies.