Does corporate governance compliance condition information asymmetries? Moderating role of voluntary disclosures

Abstract

PurposeThis study examines the moderating effects of low and high levels of voluntary disclosures (VDs) between corporate governance and information asymmetry (IA).Design/methodology/approachThe study used PROCESS macro to construct bootstrap confidence intervals at the 95% level to estimate the model, and “simple slope analysis” to visualize the model.FindingsThe better corporate governance provides a monitoring mechanism that disseminates private information and reduces IA. The effect of corporate governance on IA is contingent on the levels of VDs within a firm, and this relationship is strengthened when the level of VDs within a firm is high, and results remain consistent when levels of sub-indices are high. Additional analysis reveals that effective boards and audit committees reduce IA. Increased inside, an associated company, family and foreign ownership exacerbate IA, whereas institutional owners act as effective monitors to overcome informational disadvantages.Practical implicationsThe findings provide implications for policymakers to promote corporate governance and more relevant reporting practices as effective mechanisms for protecting shareholders' rights and attenuating IA in capital markets.Originality/valueThe study is valuable to understand the strength of the relationship between corporate governance and information asymmetries based on the moderating role of different VD levels.