Does Cheating Pay? The Effect of Electoral Misconduct on Party Systems

Abstract

This article examines the effect of electoral misconduct on party systems in new electoral regimes. The authors distinguish between different forms of electoral misconduct and argue that preelection tools—which aim to deter opposition parties and their supporters and create a biased information environment—exert a “psychological” effect on parties and voters, whereas ballot fraud exerts a direct, “mechanical” effect on vote shares. Using original data on electoral misconduct in legislative elections in Latin America and postcommunist countries, the authors find that preelection misconduct has a strong reductive effect on the effective number of parties; however, ballot fraud does not. Further investigation suggests that intimidation of opposition parties and voters is the most important mechanism through which misconduct reduces party numbers. By identifying electoral misconduct as a key omitted variable, this article renders the conventional model of party systems more applicable to the political contexts in new electoral regimes.