Does carbon emission trading scheme inhibit corporate executives' pursuit of excess compensation? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China

Abstract

Carbon regulation, which affects corporate management's carbon reduction and related decisions, has the potential to influence corporate executives' pursuit of excess compensation. Using the pilot policy of the carbon emissions trading scheme (CETS) in China as a quasi-natural experiment, we examine the impact of this policy shock on corporate executives' excess compensation through data from listed manufacturing companies from 2007 to 2020. Our findings show that the executives' excess compensation of manufacturing companies in the pilot regions shows a significant decline owing to the policy shock of CETS, which is supported by a rich set of robustness tests. Furthermore, the mechanism tests indicate that reducing agency costs and stimulating employment demand are two channels for CETS to inhibit excess compensation of corporate executives, and that the factor marketization and the nature of firms' property rights play moderating roles in this inhibitory effect. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that the inhibitory effect of CETS on the excess compensation of corporate executives also varies depending on the differences in corporate governance characteristics. Overall, these findings provide evidence for the regulatory effect of CETS in the contract design of corporate executives' compensation and also provide empirical support for emerging economies to alleviate income inequality by achieving carbon equality.