Abstract
Distance rationalization of voting rules is based on the minimization of the distance to some plausible criterion, such as unanimity or the Condorcet criterion. We propose a new alternative: the optimization of the distance to undesirable voting rules, namely, the dictatorial voting rules. Applying a plausible metric between social choice functions, we obtain two results: (i) the plurality rule minimizes the sum of the distances to the dictatorial rules and can be regarded in some sense as a compromise lying between all dictatorial rules; (ii) the reverse-plurality rule maximizes the distance to the closest dictator.
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