Abstract
I consider whether a contradiction may be deducible from the proposition that God does not exist. First, I expose a candidate counterexample to a key premise in Swinburne’s argument against the deducibility of a contradiction from God’s non-existence. Second, I present two new strategies one might use to deduce a contradiction. Both strategies make use of Tarski's T-schema together with developments in other theistic arguments. One argument is a conceptualist argument from necessary truth for a necessary mind, and the other is a two-stage contingency argument for the same conclusion. The purpose of this article is not to decisively defend these arguments, but to expose new territory relevant to investigating the nature of God's necessity (if God exists).
Highlights
It is generally thought that atheism is at least logically possible
In the history of natural theology, the primary type of argument that purports to deduce a contradiction from denying the existence of God is the ontological argument
Natural theology has proceeded under the premise that atheism is at least logically consistent
Summary
It is generally thought that atheism is at least logically possible. In the history of natural theology, the primary type of argument that purports to deduce a contradiction from denying the existence of God is the ontological argument. The only direct argument against such a deduction in recent literature (as far as I have seen) depends on the premise that, in general, a contradiction cannot be deduced from denying the existence of anything, whatever it is (see Swinburne 2012). One may plug these propositions into certain classical arguments for a minimal theism, as I will explain These arguments highlight a way of making use of other classical arguments (arguments that a theist philosopher may already have some sympathy with) to show that God’s existence is logically necessary. Before I proceed to the arguments, I’d like to highlight a few reasons why the question of the logical necessity of theism is relevant to projects in philosophy of religion. On some theistic models, God anchors (grounds or contains) all necessary truths, including logical necessities (cf Anderon and Welty 2011). I’ll share where I currently stand on the question
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