Does anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony imply interest relativism about knowledge attributions?

John Greco

doi:10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.41472

Abstract

Anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony is the thesis that testimonial knowledge is not reducible to knowledge of some other familiar kind, such as inductive knowledge. Interest relativism about knowledge attributions is the thesis that the standards for knowledge attributions are relative to practical contexts. This paper argues that anti-reductionism implies interest relativism. The notion of “implies” here is a fairly strong one: anti-reductionism, together with plausible assumptions, entails interest relativism. A second thesis of the paper is that anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony creates significant pressure toward attributor contextualism (a version of interest relativism). Even if anti-reductionism does not strictly entail attributor contextualism, the most powerful motivations for anti-reductionism also motivate attributor contextualism over alternative positions.

Highlights

Let “Anti-Reductionism” in the epistemology of testimony be the thesis that testimonial knowledge is not reducible to knowledge of some other familiar kind, such as inductive knowledge
Attributor Contextualism, a familiar form of Interest Relativism, holds that the truth-values of knowledge attributions vary across attributor contexts, and this because different attributor contexts are associated with different practical contexts
This second position agrees with Attributor Contextualism that the standards for knowledge attributions are relative to practical environments

Summary

Reductionism and Anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony

The label “anti-reductionism” is applied to various positions in the epistemology of testimony. But a standard and well-motivated meaning of the term is the following: At least some testimonial knowledge is not reducible to knowledge of some other familiar kind, such as inductive knowledge. One way to better understand the commitments of anti-reductionism, so understood, is to consider the position that it is denying. The truth-values of knowledge attributions are variable across conversational contexts because the standards for “knows” are relative to practical environments. Subject Sensitive Invariantism is a different version of Interest Relativism This second position agrees with Attributor Contextualism that the standards for knowledge attributions are relative to practical environments. It is for this reason that Subject Sensitive Invariantism is a version of Interest Relativism. The truth-values of knowledge attributions are not variable across conversational contexts With these several positions clearly in view, we may turn to an argument that Anti-Reductionism entails Interest Relativism

Anti-Reductionism implies Interest Relativism

Section 4. Does Anti-Reductionism imply Attributor Contextualism?

Conclusions