Does Accountability Vary? Institutional Effects on the Careers of State Supreme Court Justices

Abstract

Do diverse selection and retention systems influence the careers of state supreme court justices? We contend a direct connection exists between risk of removal from the bench and accountability, as institutional mechanisms present varying but predictable degrees of risk to justices. Using event history modeling, we analyze the duration of judicial tenures and resultant levels of accountability provided by selection methods. We demonstrate that justices in partisan elections have the shortest tenures and greatest risk of departure. By contrast, the Missouri Plan proved the least accountable system, offering a trivial amount of risk to justices. By proffering novel insight into judicial careers, our study enhances the judicial elections literature, while our findings diverge from rhetorical assertions of judicial reform groups maintaining that the Missouri Plan affords sufficient accountability. We thus show that judicial careers and accountability are a function of the institutional design of selection and retention systems.