Abstract
Dogmatism about perceptual warrant claims that if a subject has a perceptual experience as of p, then this can provide immediate and defeasible warrant to believe that p. Crispin Wright has put forward three original criticisms of this view. First, and most extensively, Wright argues that the dogmatist is committed to implausible answers to questions about when subjects are in a position to claim warrant to believe certain propositions. Second, he claims that the view is too permissive in assigning warrant in cases in which a subject has balanced evidence regarding the proper functioning of her perceptual system. Finally, he argues that the oft-included restriction of immediate and defeasible dogmatic warrant to perceptually basic beliefs results in a view that is unable to claim that beliefs about normal external world objects are warranted. I argue that none of these objections can be sustained and that dogmatism does not have the problematic consequences that Wright alleges.
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