Doch keine Freizügigkeit für Arme? – Zur Notwendigkeit einer Abwägung unterschiedlicher konstitutioneller Interessen

Abstract

Abstract In reply to Jörg Markt and Gerhard Schick in this volume, this paper argues for a different view on social assistance and migration. First, this article will present some methodological conditions for constitutional contracts. Lacking empirical testability, the method of constitutional economics particularly needs the revelation of constitutional interests before evaluating alternative rules. By testing the described alternative rules of migration in the face of potential constitutional interests, it will be shown that no rule discussed meets all targets. The reader has to be aware that Märkt/Schick decided to meet the target of free migration for welfare recipients and thereby missed some essential targets of social assistance. In this paper it is questioned, if the objective of free migration for welfare recipients is as important as it looks at first glance. It is argued that liberty as a constitutional interest can be restricted by rational constitutional voters. Behind the veil of uncertainty it might be necessary to limit the external diseconomy from free-riding welfare recipients in social assistance schemes or the external diseconomy from the poor in the utility-interdependence sense. If the reader comes to share this point of view, there is no need to harm the original constitutional interests related to social assistance.