Do Words Stink? Neural Reuse as a Principle for Understanding Emotions in Reading.

Johannes C Ziegler,Benny B Briesemeister,Bruno Wicker,Arthur M Jacobs,Mario Braun,Tila T Brink,Aurélie Ponz,Marie Montant,Mireille Bonnard

doi:10.1162/jocn_a_01268

Abstract

How do we understand the emotional content of written words? Here, we investigate the hypothesis that written words that carry emotions are processed through phylogenetically ancient neural circuits that are involved in the processing of the very same emotions in nonlanguage contexts. This hypothesis was tested with respect to disgust. In an fMRI experiment, it was found that the same region of the left anterior insula responded whether people observed facial expressions of disgust or whether they read words with disgusting content. In a follow-up experiment, it was found that repetitive TMS over the left insula in comparison with a control site interfered with the processing of disgust words to a greater extent than with the processing of neutral words. Together, the results support the hypothesis that the affective processes we experience when reading rely on the reuse of phylogenetically ancient brain structures that process basic emotions in other domains and species.

Highlights

How do people understand the emotional content of a written word? Classic psycholinguistic theories would argue that emotional content is not processed any different from other forms of meaning
In the fMRI study, conjunction analyses showed that the same region of the anterior insula was activated whether people looked at disgusted faces or read disgusting words (x = −39, y = 23, z = −14)
In the fMRI experiment, we found an overlap of the increased BOLD signal in the left anterior insula when people observe facial expressions of disgust and when they read words with disgusting content, as compared with emotionally neutral conditions

Summary

Introduction

How do people understand the emotional content of a written word? Classic psycholinguistic theories would argue that emotional content is not processed any different from other forms of meaning. Computationally speaking, understanding what it means for somebody to be “happy” would not be any different from understanding what it means to be “alive” or “tall.” In both cases, meaning is processed through the computation or analysis of abstract semantic properties or features (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008; Pexman, Holyk, & Monfils, 2003; McRae, de Sa, & Seidenberg, 1997). This could be called the “cold” view of reading ( Jacobs et al, 2015; Jacobs & Ziegler, 2015).

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