Do Women Always Behave As Corruption Cleaners?

Abstract

We conduct an experiment to analyze the conditions under which individuals’ propensity to engage in bribery and tolerance towards corrupt actors differ across gender. We manipulate the key bribery dimensions — the benefits to corrupt actors and the negative externality caused to other people. We show that neither gender is uniformly more corruption prone/tolerant: it depends upon both the exact bribery conditions, their interaction, and the role taken in the bribe act. Females are less bribery prone/tolerant when externality to society increases (under low gains to corrupt actors) and turns welfare-enhancing bribes into welfare reducing. Men punish corrupt actors more severely when the latter gain greater benefits (under high externality). Females’ behavior is consistent across roles when bribery yields a negative welfare shift — but, apart from that, gender behavior is strongly role-dependent. We also collect data on subjects’ anger towards corrupt actors, and show that gender differences in such feelings sync with differences in punishment.