Abstract
AbstractSocial norms play an important role in individual decision making. We argue that two different expectations influence our choice to obey a norm: what we expect others to do (empirical expectations) and what we believe others think we ought to do (normative expectations). Little is known about the relative importance of these two types of expectation in individuals' decisions, an issue that is particularly important when normative and empirical expectations are in conflict (e.g., systemic corruption, high crime cities). In this paper, we report data from Dictator game experiments where we exogenously manipulate dictators' expectations in the direction of either selfishness or fairness. When normative and empirical expectations are in conflict, we find that empirical expectations about other dictators' choices significantly predict a dictator's own choice. However, dictators' expectations regarding what other dictators think ought to be done do not have a significant impact on their decisions after controlling for empirical expectations. Our findings about the crucial influence of empirical expectations are important for designing institutions or policies aimed at discouraging undesirable behavior. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Highlights
People often follow social norms, such as norms of reciprocity or fairness, even when obedience is not in their immediate self-interest and there is no obvious sanction looming over the potential transgressor
Our results provide evidence that empirical expectations about other dictators’ behaviors, but not normative expectations, are a key force behind dictators’ choices
Dictator’s expectations by treatment Every dictator answered the question “How many dividers in this room do you think split the money approximately” (this is their empirical expectation of fair offers, EE(fairness))
Summary
People often follow social norms, such as norms of reciprocity or fairness, even when obedience is not in their immediate self-interest and there is no obvious sanction looming over the potential transgressor. Social norms are recognized as important motivations behind individual decision making in several economic models (see, e.g., Elster, 1989; Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Camerer, 2003). Empirical studies of norm conformity clearly show that focusing people on an existing norm is an important step toward compliance (Cialdini et al, 1990). As argued by Bicchieri (2006), whether people obey a norm depends crucially on two types of expectations: empirical and normative. Individuals have preferences for conforming to social norms that are conditional on both types of expectations being present. This paper provides, to our knowledge, the first evidence regarding the relative influence of empirical and normative expectations on individual decisions in situations involving social norms
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