Abstract
We study the school choice market with some affirmative action. Kojima (2012) shows that there exists no stable mechanism that respects the spirit of affirmative action. We con- sider stronger affirmative action policy than him, and demonstrate that any stable mechanism can hurt the minority students, even though all schools implement the affirmative action policy. Furthermore, as Kojima (2012), we also demonstrate that another well known assignment mechanism “the Top Trading Cycles mechanism” can hurt the minority students under both our defined affirmative actions policy and priority-based affirmative actions policy.
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