Abstract

Resource systems with enforced rules and strong monitoring systems typically have more predictable resource abundance, which can confer economic and social benefits to local communities. Co-management regimes demonstrate better social and ecological outcomes, but require an active role by community members in management activities, such as monitoring and enforcement. Previous work has emphasized understanding what makes fishermen comply with rules. This research takes a different approach to understand what influences an individual to enforce rules, particularly sea tenure. We conducted interviews and used multiple regression and Akaike’s Information Criteria model selection to evaluate the effect of social networks, food security, recent catch success, fisherman’s age and personal gear investment on individual’s enforcement of sea tenure. We found that fishermen’s enforcement of sea tenure declined between the two time periods measured and that social networks, age, food security, and changes in gear investment explained enforcement behavior across three different communities on Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast, an area undergoing rapid globalization.

Highlights

  • Fisheries are a challenging system to manage due to the mobility and nonexcludability of the resource

  • We examine how the behavioral characteristics of a fisherman’s social network affect his own behavior, his enforcement of sea tenure

  • We examined 1) whether enforcement behavior amongst individual fishermen changed over time, 2) if social networks had an influence on that change and 3) other factors that explain changes in fishermen’s behavior

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Summary

Introduction

Fisheries are a challenging system to manage due to the mobility and nonexcludability of the resource. Evidence from around the world has demonstrated the effectiveness and conservation benefits of a variety of sea tenure regimes [1],[2]. Fisheries with enforced rules result in greater fish biomass and abundance, improved habitat and increased fishermen’s incomes [3],[4]. Evidence suggests that fisheries have better ecological, social and economic outcomes under a co-management regime in which responsibility for management is shared between resource users and typically, a government agency [5],[6],[7],[8]. Co-management implies local involvement in rule-making and enforcement, which reduces transaction costs for enforcement [9],[10].

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