Abstract

This article analyzes whether publicly traded firms price differently from privately held firms in the product markets. Our empirical evidence shows that, in the U.S. newspaper industry, firms increase their prices when their ownership structure changes from private to public. The effects are robust and significant. A plausible explanation is that private owners enjoy more freedom than public managers to expand circulation and distort content, pursuing the consumption of nonpecuniary benefits of control. Additional evidence is consistent with this interpretation. Public newspapers show lower prices when insiders' ownership participation is higher. Moreover, private newspapers appear more likely than public newspapers to endorse a candidate during presidential campaigns. To my knowledge there are no previous studies comparing pricing by private and public companies. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.