Do professional shareholders matter for corporate compliance with IFRS reporting requirements: the moderating effect of board independence

Abstract

PurposeFrom an agency theory realm, this study aims to respond to the more recent calls to deeply analyze the indirect influence of professional shareholders, namely, institutional, blockholder and foreign owners, on the extent of compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) mandatory reporting requirements.Design/methodology/approachMultivariate regression analysis was applied. Moreover, quantitative static and dynamic panel data have been used. More plainly, ordinary least squares was run as a baseline estimator. Afterwards, one-step system generalized method of moment and two-stage least squares were conducted to control for the potential endogeneity dilemma. The analysis is based on a sample of nonfinancial listed firms on the Palestine Stock Exchange for the time span of 10 years, from 2010 to 2019.FindingsAfter controlling for the detrimental effect of the endogeneity issue, the findings clearly reveal that the effect of the three types of professional shareholders (institutional, blockholder and foreign) on the extent of compliance with IFRS is more significant under a high proportion of independent nonexecutive directors.Originality/valueTo the best of the author’s knowledge, prior literature on the nexus between shareholding structure and compliance level with IFRS has restricted solely to analyzing the direct influence without casting the light on the moderation effect of independent nonexecutive directors. Hence, analyzing this sensitive configuration merits attention. In this vein, to ameliorate the compliance level with IFRS, regulators have to devote remarkable effort to updating both enforcement mechanisms and best practices of shareholding structure simultaneously.