Do Private Equity Funds Game Returns?

Abstract

By their nature, private equity funds hold assets that are hard to value. This uncertainty in asset valuation gives rise to the potential for fund managers to manipulate reported net asset values (NAVs). Managers may have an incentive to game valuations in the short-run if returns on existing funds are used by investors to make decisions about commitments to subsequent funds managed by the same firm. Using a large dataset of buyout and venture funds, we test for the presence of reported NAV manipulation. We find evidence of managers boosting reported NAVs during times that fundraising activity is likely to occur. However, this behavior is mostly limited to firms that are subsequently unsuccessful at raising a next fund which suggests that investors see through the manipulation. In contrast, we find evidence that top-performing funds underreport returns. This conservatism is consistent with these firms insuring against future bad luck that could make them appear as though they are NAV manipulators. Our results are robust to a variety of specifications and alternative explanations.