Do political promotion incentive and fiscal incentive of local governments matter for the marine environmental pollution? Evidence from China’s coastal areas

Abstract

With the continuous advancement of urbanization and the rapid growth of the marine economy, marine environmental pollution has become an increasingly important problem. In this paper, using a comprehensive feasible generalized least square (FGLS) method and panel data of China’s 11 coastal areas from 2002 to 2016, we analyzed the impact of political promotion incentive and fiscal incentive on marine environmental pollution and identified the transmission mechanism of officials’ tenure to marine environmental pollution. The results show that (1) in order to achieve a political promotion, local officials promote economic growth at the expense of marine resources and the environment, deteriorating the quality of the marine environment in their jurisdiction. (2) Under the influence of the fiscal decentralization system, the financial pressure of local governments is an important factor that affects the quality of the marine environment in its jurisdiction. Fiscal incentives (measured by land transfer fees and sea area royalties) are positively related to marine environmental pollution. (3) The tenure of local officials and marine environmental pollution have an inverted U-shaped nonlinear relationship, and the effect of promotion incentive on the quality of the marine environment is aggravated by the tenure of local officials. It is the first report to discuss the causes of marine environmental pollution in coastal areas in China from the perspective of China’s fiscal decentralization system and political promotion tournaments.