Do Perceiver Effects in Interpersonal Perception Predict Cooperation in Social Dilemmas?

Richard Rau,Mitja D Back,Sascha Krause,Steffen Nestler,Lucie Nikoleizig,Katharina Geukes,Simon M Breil,Isabel Thielmann,M Brent Donnellan

doi:10.1525/collabra.332

Abstract

People’s general tendencies to view others as cold-hearted and manipulative (rather than affectionate and trustworthy) may explain defection in social dilemma situations. To capture idiosyncratic tendencies in other-perceptions, we collected mutual judgments in groups of unacquainted individuals in two studies (N1 = 83, N2 = 413) and extracted perceiver effect scores using the Social Relations Model. In both studies, participants later played a public goods game. In Study 1, perceiver effects predicted cooperation beyond self-reported and group-related control variables. However, results were not replicated in a preregistered second study with higher power and a more diverse sample. We discuss implicit group norms as a likely explanation for the inconsistent findings and suggest future directions for addressing generalized expectations in social dilemmas.

Highlights

IntroductionPeople’s general tendencies to view others as cold-hearted and manipulative (rather than affectionate and trustworthy) may explain defection in social dilemma situations
People’s general tendencies to view others as cold-hearted and manipulative may explain defection in social dilemma situations
Cooperation and Defection in Public Goods Environments A widespread approach for creating a social dilemma in experimental research is via the public goods game (PGG): Players are part of a group of n members who are endowed with an initial asset a and asked to simultaneously decide whether to contribute their asset to a public good

Summary

Introduction

People’s general tendencies to view others as cold-hearted and manipulative (rather than affectionate and trustworthy) may explain defection in social dilemma situations. To capture idiosyncratic tendencies in other-perceptions, we collected mutual judgments in groups of unacquainted individuals in two studies (N1 = 83, N2 = 413) and extracted perceiver effect scores using the Social Relations Model. In both studies, participants later played a public goods game. We discuss implicit group norms as a likely explanation for the inconsistent findings and suggest future directions for addressing generalized expectations in social dilemmas Many societal goals such as environmental protection or political engagement are characterized by a conflict of interests: Cooperative behaviors (e.g., separating waste, voting) have short-term costs for the individual but promise a profitable long-term payoff for everyone. Individual Differences in Social Dilemma Choices A myriad of traits have been shown to be related to social dilemma choices including rather narrow constructs such as altruism (e.g., Haesevoets et al, 2018; McAuliffe et al, 2019), social value orientation

Results

Discussion

Conclusion