Do Opportunity Costs of Regulations Appropriately Benefit or Inappropriately Burden Disadvantaged Consumers?

Abstract

Abstract President Biden’s first-day memo “Modernizing Regulatory Review” directs the Office of Management and Budget to “propose procedures that take into account the distributional consequences of regulations… to ensure that regulatory initiatives appropriately benefit and do not inappropriately burden disadvantaged, vulnerable, or marginalized communities.” This paper makes two contributions. First, it discusses how economic analysis can transparently provide the information needed to make value-judgments about what distributional effects are appropriate and inappropriate. Second, it discusses the distributional consequences of regulations that are either designed to reduce internalities or might have the additional benefit of reducing internalities. Examples include tobacco product regulations, appliance energy efficiency standards, and automobile fuel efficiency standards. In many cases, the regulations will increase the prices or decrease the availability of goods that disadvantaged consumers prefer. This paper discussed how to determine whether restricting their consumption opportunities creates net benefits or net costs for disadvantaged consumers. Inframarginal consumers who do not change their consumption face higher opportunity costs but do not receive any benefits from reduced internalities. Empirical challenges include the need to quantify the fraction of inframarginal consumers and the size of the internalities.