Do Nomic Relations Exist?

Abstract

Thus far I have argued for a metaphysics of fundamental natural properties and relations of the actual world. In particular, I put forward the thesis that fundamentally our world is a categorical–monistic one (henceforth, a C-world). A metaphysics of properties almost always comes together with a corresponding metaphysics of laws of nature. This is obviously true in the case of laws which essentially involve ontologically robust natural (fundamental) properties and relations. Instances of that case is the DTA theory of laws as relations between universals and, more generally, any account of laws as relations between properties construed as belonging to a distinct (from concrete particulars) ontological category. But it is also true even within broadly nominalistic metaphysical contexts where we do not have a substantial notion of a natural property. The reason, in that case, is that one of the main roles of natural properties is to help explain the behaviour of their bearers. It is assumed, however, that laws of nature, if they exist, purport to fill the same role; hence, the inevitable connection. So, in the chapters to follow, I’ll present the basic metaphysical consequences of my preferred account of the nature of fundamental properties for laws of nature.