Abstract
Abstract A highlighted issue in long-term care (LTC) financing is the presence of unfortunate incentives in financing schemes. For instance, in Norway, a high share of high-income recipients provides financial incentives to the local governments (the agencies in charge of the LTC system) to increase reliance on nursing home care relative to community housing and home-based care. This article examines the effects of the Norwegian LTC funding system on the composition of LTC services at the local government level. I use a cross-section from 2009 of 391 local governments to estimate a fractional probit model using quasi-maximum likelihood estimation. Controlling for need and geographical variations in care costs, I find that the share of “rich” elderly has a significant association with three measures of the volume of nursing home care relative to home-based care.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
