Abstract
We propose and implement, for the first time, a direct test of the hypothesis of implicit collusion in the U.S. underwriting market against the alternative of oligopolistic competition. We construct two models of an underwriting market — a market characterized by oligopolistic competition among IPO underwriters and a market in which banks collude in setting underwriter fees. The two models
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