Do investors turn a blind eye to risk-factor disclosures by state-supported firms?

Abstract

There is scant empirical evidence on how government involvement affects investor reactions toward firm-specific information. Our study provides new evidence on how investors respond to risk-factor disclosures in IPO prospectuses in China, where state-supported firms presumably receive government-offered implicit insurance against bankruptcy risk while bearing significant agency risks. We find an insignificant association between risk-factor disclosure quality and IPO underpricing (or post-IPO stock return volatility) among state-supported firms. The finding suggests that state-offered implicit insurance becomes the predominant consideration when investors value IPO shares of state-supported firms, thereby weakening investor reactions to high-quality risk-factor disclosures. Our study expands the scope of IPO underpricing literature by implying that simply increasing disclosure transparency in the IPO prospectus may not resolve the IPO underpricing issue in a government-dominated economy such as China.