Do International Remittances Affect Poverty in Africa?*

Abstract

Abstract: International remittances flowing into developing countries are attracting increasing attention because of their rising volume and their impact on recipient countries. This paper uses a panel data set on poverty and international remittances for African countries to examine the impact of international remittances on poverty reduction in 33 African countries over the period 1990–2005. We find that international remittances—defined as the share of remittances in country GDP—reduce the level, depth, and severity of poverty in Africa. But the size of the poverty reduction depends on how poverty is being measured. After instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of international remittances, we find that a 10 percent increase in official international remittances as a share of GDP leads to a 2.9 percent decline in the poverty headcount or the share of people living in poverty. Also, the more sensitive poverty measures—the poverty gap (poverty depth) and squared poverty gap (poverty severity)—suggest that international remittances will have a similar impact on poverty reduction. The point estimates for the poverty gap and squared poverty gap suggest that a 10 percent increase in the share of international remittances will lead to a 2.9 percent and 2.8 percent decline, respectively, in the depth and severity of poverty in African countries. Regardless of the measure of poverty used as the dependent variable, income inequality (Gini index) has a positive and significant coefficient, indicating that greater inequality is associated with higher poverty in African countries, much in conformity with the literature. Similar results were obtained for trade openness. In the same vein, per capita income has a negative and significant effect on each measure of poverty used in the study. Our results also show that inflation rates positively and significantly affect poverty incidence, depth and severity in Africa. In all three poverty measures, the dummy variable for sub‐Saharan Africa is strongly positive, and strongly negative for North Africa. The policy implications of these results are discussed.