Abstract
We use proprietary institutional trading data to analyze the efficacy of information production by institutions around CEO turnovers; CEO turnovers where such information production is most effective; and how institutions produce such information. We find that institutional trading prior to a CEO turnover has significant predictive power for the nature of a CEO turnover (forced versus voluntary). Institutions produce information partly by analyzing insider trading prior to a CEO turnover. Trading by institutions after a forced turnover with an insider as successor CEO has significant predictive power for subsequent long-run stock returns, and realizes significant abnormal profits.
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