Abstract
We examine the role of the target firm's independent outside directors during takeover attempts by tender offer. We find that when the target's board is independent, the initial tender offer premium, the bid premium revision, and the target shareholder gains over the entire tender offer period are higher, and that the presence of a poison pill and takeover resistance lead to greater premiums and shareholder gains. We conclude that independent outside directors enhance target shareholder gains from tender offers, and that boards with a majority of independent directors are more likely to use resistance strategies to enhance shareholder wealth.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
