Abstract
AbstractUsing foreign investors’ shareholding to proxy for foreign investors’ monitoring effect in the Chinese stock market, we find that those acquirers exhibit higher announcement returns with higher shareholding, and this effect is stronger when acquirers are private firms. We provide price efficiency and corporate governance channels through which foreign investors play a monitoring role in mergers and acquisitions. Finally, foreign investors decrease the likelihood that managers will conduct mergers in the future and significantly improve long‐run performance. Our study provides new insights into the real effects of foreign investors on acquisition performance and the economy.
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