Abstract

Simultaneous bank defaults are often attributed to interbank contagion, but can also be due to common shocks affecting banks with similar balance sheets. We disentangle both effects by realising that if financial markets expect a bank's default to be contagious, an increase in this bank's default probability should lower other banks' market valuations. When we regress changes in banks' market values on changes in other banks' default probabilities for the 2007-2009 financial crisis, we find no evidence for such an effect. This finding suggests that contagion risk has been overestimated, which has implications for financial regulation and crisis management.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.