Do financial crises moderate the influence of stakeholder rights protection on M&A activity: The influence of institutional logics and power?

Abstract

AbstractResearch SummaryM&A represents a contested process of change in control influenced by two contending prevailing institutional logics: shareholder‐centered and labor‐oriented. These logics, whose respective power is influenced by national laws, shape mergers and acquisition (M&A) outcomes. Crises, like systemic financial crises, are periods during which these logics may be altered. This research examines how financial crises affect the positive (negative) relationship between the legal protection of shareholder (labor) rights and M&A activity in a country. Utilizing a dataset from financial services companies across 35 countries from 1990 to 2016, we find that financial crises significantly weaken the effects of both shareholder and labor rights on M&A transactions. Our findings emphasize the role of power dynamics amidst conflicting institutional logics in determining M&A outcomes during both crisis and non‐crisis periods.Managerial SummaryIn the world of mergers and acquisitions, the battle for control is influenced by two major opposing forces: shareholders and employees, with their power rooted in the country's laws. Countries with high protection of shareholder rights witness higher M&A activity compared to those more protective of labor rights. However, drawing from data covering financial services firms in 35 countries from 1990 to 2016, we discovered that financial crises tend to weaken the influence of both shareholder and employee rights on M&A deals. This insight highlights the importance of understanding the differences in the functioning of the M&A market across countries and the shifting power dynamics between shareholders and employees, especially in times of financial uncertainty, for those involved in planning and executing M&A strategies.