Abstract
This paper contributes to the corporate governance literature and bears implications for the regulation of insider trading. I examine whether the double-counting of reported trading volume on Nasdaq plays a role in insiders’ decisions to move their firms. Specifically, since volume on Nasdaq is exaggerated and SEC Rule 144 ties the limit on insider selling to total volume, insiders of troubled firms may be able to use private information to take advantage of other shareholders by switching to Nasdaq and unloading more stock. Consistent with the hypothesis, I find that insiders engage in heavy selling of company stock in the months following the move. Post-announcement abnormal returns are strongly negative.
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