Do controlling shareholders collude with their related large shareholders? Evidence of equity pledges and shareholding increases from China

Abstract

The key for controlling shareholders to prevent the risk of equity pledge is to increase the stock price, and the large shareholders' shareholding increases have the effect of increasing the stock price. Using the data of Chinese A-share firms from 2007 to 2019, this paper examines the relationship between the controlling shareholders' equity pledges and their related large shareholders' shareholding increases. We find that when the controlling shareholders pledge equity, their related large shareholders are more likely to increase their shareholdings. By analyzing the necessity, ability and motivation of related large shareholders to provide help, we find that shareholding increases of related large shareholders are behaviors of helping controlling shareholders to mitigate the risk of equity pledge. Based on the analysis of external acquisition threats, stability heterogeneity of control rights and exogenous impact of Vanke Equity Competition, it is shown that the controlling shareholders pledging equity promote their related large shareholders to increase their shareholdings for the purpose of preventing the risk of control transfer. In further analysis, we find that the shareholding increases of related large shareholders have the practical effect of improving the stock price and preventing pledge risks. This paper proves that the controlling shareholders pledging equity collude with their related large shareholders, which is reflected in the fact that the shareholding increases of the related large shareholders have become a means for controlling shareholders to prevent the risk of equity pledge.