Do companies compare employees’ salaries? Evidence from stated-owned enterprise group

Abstract

The mechanism by which enterprises set salaries is vitally important to employees and is especially relevant to the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This paper investigates the effect of comparing employee compensation based on a sample of A-share SOE groups from 2008 to 2018. We find that when employee compensation at one company sharply increases, the employee compensation of other companies controlled by the same group will increase sharply in the following year. Further analysis shows that when employees’ sense of unfair compensation is stronger, when employees are less replaceable and when enterprises’ ability to pay is stronger, the effect of employee pay comparison is stronger. Increased employee salary does not improve enterprise performance, however, suggesting that such salary adjustment is ineffective. This paper expands the research on employee compensation and provides useful insights for optimizing the design of compensation contracts and promoting compensation reform in SOEs.