Abstract

AbstractIn this paper, we shed light on interactions among the various investors operating within the entrepreneurial finance ecosystem. Specifically, we aim to investigate what business angel (BA) investment practices are correlated with follow‐on venture capital (VC) financing, and uncover the strategies that determine a complementary‐based or a substitution‐based relationship with VCs. We analysed a sample of 176 companies that received a BA investment during 2008–2016 and collected financial data over a 10‐year period after the BA investment. The data examined indicate that BAs’ selectivity, as measured by their rejection rate, and BAs’ affiliation to an angel network, are positively related with the probability of raising follow‐on VC financing. However, a high level of BAs’ monitoring activity negatively influences the probability of obtaining VC funding. Interestingly, BA networks do affect this relationship. The positive impact of BAs’ rejection rate is informative for VC decisions if the BA does not invest through a network. Conversely, a high level of monitoring may convey a negative signal for VC, particularly if the BA is affiliated to a network. These results extend our knowledge of the investment practices of BAs and their role in allowing angel‐backed companies to raise follow‐on VC financing.

Highlights

  • Business angels (BAs) and professional venture capitalists (VCs) play a pivotal role in the entrepreneurial finance ecosystem

  • We shed light on a promising and novel stream of literature on BA and VC financing by focusing on the interactions among the various investors operating within the entrepreneurial finance ecosystem

  • We investigated what BA investment strategies are correlated with follow-on VC financing

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Summary

Introduction

Business angels (BAs) and professional venture capitalists (VCs) play a pivotal role in the entrepreneurial finance ecosystem. BAs, in comparison to VCs, implement a more informal selection process, use their personal experience to evaluate projects, rely on fewer control rights and prefer active monitoring to formal control rights (Bonini et al, 2018; Cumming and Johan, 2008), and have less pressure to exit the investment within a set timeframe. Such divergent perspectives result in the preference for different strategic decisions, which can lead to conflict and incompatibility in VC follow-on rounds (Cumming and Johan, 2008). The fifth section reports the empirical results, and the sixth section concludes the paper

Related literature
Hypothesis development
Variables and descriptive statistics
IBAN survey IBAN survey
BAN membership
Findings
Conclusions
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