Abstract
AbstractThis study examines whether S&P 500 boards govern their firms effectively by linking short-term operational objectives to appropriate CEO bonus performance measures. Our cross-sectional regression analysis reveals that firms with higher growth opportunities place more reliance on sales and growth performance measures in CEO bonus plans. We also find that cash-strapped firms emphasize the use of cash-based CEO performance measures. However, boards of high-cost firms do not tie a greater portion of CEO bonus to measures informative of cost-cutting efforts. This observation is contrary to effective-governance expectations and implies that boards should regularly scrutinize CEO bonus measures to ensure alignment with value-creating firm objectives. Additionally, we report an increase over time in the mean weight of social-and-environmental measures in CEO bonus plans. Boards evaluate CEO performance on sustainability issues by including quantifiable short-term performance targets in CEO bonus plans. However, there is currently a dearth of evidence on the optimality of sustainability linked executive pay in the academic literature. Our evidence on the rising weight of social-and-environmental measures in CEO bonus plans should motivate further research on this topic.
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