Düşünce Deneyleri Doğallaştırıldı

Abstract

Thought experiments have long been utilized in science and philosophy. They come in various forms, from Schrödinger's cat in physics to the Chinese room argument in philosophy. Although thought experiments are used widely, scant attention has been paid to how thought experiments actually work. In philosophy literature, it has been argued that thought experiments are a disguised form of meaning analysis. Thought experiments rely on the notion of analyticity on their basis, and therefore they should be abandoned. In this paper, I argue that if we distinguish conceivability type thought experiments commonly found in philosophy from factive thought experiments widely used in science, a viable methodological alternative can be found. I propose a set of criteria to define factive thought experiments precisely. I show how factive thought experiments can be successfully used in philosophical reasoning by giving examples, mainly from Wittgenstein's work. In this way, I argue, it is possible to naturalize thought experimentation.