Abstract
Taking revised claims about modified H5N1 influenza viruses into account, the members of the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) last March reversed their earlier unanimous recommendations and called for publishing two revised reports describing that research (Microbe, May 2012, p. 214). However, that reversal provoked a pointed protest from NSABB member Michael Osterholm of the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, and did not quell the broader debate about how to handle this or other cases involving dual-use research of concern (DURC). Also in March, U.S. officials issued a policy statement mandating federal agencies to review federally funded projects entailing potential DURC and to develop plans for dealing with them.
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