Division of Entities and Foundations of Reality: Aristotle’s Ontological Square

Abstract

AbstractIn my paper, I analyse some aspects regarding Aristotle’s interpretation of the organisation of ontology. In my opinion, Aristotle is looking for a new ontology in many of his works. Hence, in his investigation, Aristotle aims to discover the correct components of the ontology and to put these components in their due ontological place. Being qua being, categories, substance among the categories, universals, form, matter and so on are analysed and defined by Aristotle throughout his works.In this analysis, I concentrate my attention on two schemes of reality which, in Aristotle, precede, at least as regards some aspects, the other structures of reality. These schemes, which constitute the first frame of reality, are the two-district scheme and the four-domain scheme. The two-district scheme is the structure of reality composed by individual entities and by universal entities; the four-domain scheme consists in the structure of reality composed by individual substantial entities, individual non-substantial entities, universal substantial properties and universal non-substantial properties. The four-domain scheme, which is representable in the form of the ontological square, is an extension of the two-district scheme.The mentioned districts and domains correspond to Aristotle’s realms of reality. These realms are mutually incompatible in the sense that any entity can belong only to one of these realms, but they are not mutually isolated, since, for example, individual entities are instances of the corresponding universal entities. The discovery, explanation and analysis of these schemes are keys to determining the position of the different entities in the reality. Without a correct understanding of the position of the entities in the reality, no ontology can function correctly. For example, entities which have, in the reality, the position of instances must always be distinguished from entities which, within the reality, do not have the position of instances; individual entities must always be distinguished by common entities and by universals. Through the distinction regarding entities which are instances and entities which are not instances, Aristotle is opening the fields of existence to different realms of entities. Not only does numerically one entity exist, universal entities exist too.Ontological square (four-domain scheme) and two-district scheme represent the basic structure, the very framework of Aristotle’s ontology, since they are the general rule of Aristotle’s ontology. Any interpretation of ontology which does not respect the distinction existing between entities and which is expressed through these schemes leads to the collapse of the ontology itself or paves the way for this collapse, as witnessed, for example, by the Third Man regress. The inquiry on Aristotle’s four-domain scheme is completed by a comparison between Aristotle’s position and the positions of E. J. Lowe’s ontological square.I contend that Aristotle interprets individual entities as instances of properties (or as instantiated properties). The basic status of the individual entity consists in its being an instance of a property. Furthermore, Aristotle considers universal properties as being programmes/dispositions concretised in the individual entities (at least as regards biological properties). Within Aristotle’s ontology, the particular existence field of the instances is always constituted by individuals (by individual entities), while the whole field of existence is constituted both by individuals (by individual entities) and by universal properties. Hence, reality does not consist exclusively of individuals. Properties, at least biological properties like “being man” or “being animal”, are programmes/dispositions being concretised through their instances. Their existence does not depend on the existence of one particular instance; it does not depend, likewise, on the existence of a determined plurality, but it does depend on the existence of at least one instance: properties do not transcend the dimension of the individual entities.In order to explain the consequences deriving from a misunderstanding of the realms of reality, I analyse the arguments of “the One Over Many” and of the “Third Man” from Aristotle’s lost work De Ideis. In the Third Man Argument, it becomes clear that, if within an ontology an entity, which is not an instance, is interpreted as an instance, the consequence of this mistake is the collapse of the whole ontology.KeywordsRealms of realityAristotle Categories Metaphysics De Ideis Typological ontologyTwo-district ontologyFour-domain ontologyOntological squareSubstanceUniversal propertiesIndividualsParticularsUniversalsLoweKungLiskeOne Over ManyThird ManMathematics Subject ClassificationPrimary 03A05·Secondary 03A10, 03B38, 03B65, 03B80