Divine Knowledge, Divine Power and Human Freedom in Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent

Abstract

In this chapter I shall limit myself to two thinkers from the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent. Since Thomas devoted considerably more attention to this topic than did Henry, and since Aquinas’s position was to become the focal point for centuries of subsequent controversy, the greater part of my remarks will be devoted to him. In discussing Thomas’s position I shall try to cover the points suggested in my title by reducing them to two major concerns: (1) Thomas’s explanation of God’s knowledge of future contingents; (2) his views concerning the causal character of God’s knowledge and God’s will. In each case I shall attempt to show how Thomas reconciles his explanation with man’s freedom. Henry lectured as Master in theology at the University of Paris from 1276 until ca. 1292, and on the present topic may serve as an interesting link between Aquinas and Duns Scotus (though Scotus’s position will not be examined here).1 Henry had developed a radically different kind of metaphysics from that of Aquinas.2 Of greatest interest to us will be Henry’s explanation of God’s knowledge of future contingents.KeywordsCausal ActivityFuture ContingentCausal CharacterDivine ForeknowledgeDivine KnowledgeThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.