Divine Hiddenness and Affective Forecasting

Miles Andrews

doi:10.7710/2155-4838.1106

Abstract

In this paper I argue that J. L. Schellenberg’s Divine Hiddenness Argument is committed to a problematic implication that is weakened by research in cognitive psychology on affective forecasting. Schellenberg’s notion of a nonresistant nonbeliever logically implies that for any such person, it is true that she would form the proper belief in God if provided with what he calls “probabilifying” evidence for God’s existence. In light of Schellenberg’s commitment to the importance of both affective and propositional belief components for entering into the proper relationship with God, this implication of his argument becomes an affective prediction or forecast. However, research in cognitive psychology has shown that in multiple and varied circumstances humans often make inaccurate predictions of their future affective states or reactions. Thus, this research provides strong empirical reasons to doubt that the implication is warranted.

Highlights

Why is God hidden? There has been much debate in the literature concerning J
Schellenberg’s Divine Hiddenness Argument (DHA) since the publication of his Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason in 1993.1 Briefly stated, the argument says that the existence of nonresistant nonbelief is evidence against the existence of God, where nonbelief occurs whenever one “fails to believe that there is a God.”2 Fleshing this out, Schellenberg focuses on God as traditionally conceived: omnipotent, omniscient, possessing all creative responsibility, and most importantly, as perfectly loving
The DHA is committed to a problematic claim that is challenged by evidence I will cite from cognitive psychology

Summary

Introduction

Why is God hidden? There has been much debate in the literature concerning J. L. Schellenberg’s Divine Hiddenness Argument (DHA) since the publication of his Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason in 1993.1 Briefly stated, the argument says that the existence of nonresistant nonbelief is evidence against the existence of God, where nonbelief occurs whenever one “fails (for whatever reason and in whatever way) to believe that there is a God.” Fleshing this out, Schellenberg focuses on God as traditionally conceived: omnipotent, omniscient, possessing all creative responsibility, and most importantly, as perfectly loving. Schellenberg argues that if a perfectly loving God exists, God’s creatures are always in a position to enter into a conscious, positively meaningful personal relationship with God by trying. As Schellenberg sometimes puts it, the absence of evidence for theism constitutes strong evidence for atheism

An Implication of DHA

Affective Religious Belief

Affective Forecasting

The Problem for DHA

Findings

Conclusion